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Consult, Consent, and Veto:
International Norms and Canadian
Treaties
Shin Imai1
In 2007, the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples
validated the necessity of obtaining free, prior, and informed consent before instituting
significant extractive industry projects on Indigenous lands. The most surprising
development since the declaration’s adoption is the take-up of the standard by non-state
private sector actors. International institutions such as the International Finance
Corporation of the World Bank, the financial institutions that have adopted the Equator
Principles, and the International Council on Mining and Metals have published policies
accepting the necessity of obtaining free, prior, informed consent. In Canada, private
sector actors have also recognized the consent standard, including the Prospectors and
Developers Association of Canada and a grouping of industry, financial institutions, and
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First Nation organizations called the Boreal Forest Initiative. Obviously, adopting some
version of the consent standard makes practical and financial sense to the industry.
The courts in Canada have dealt with extractive projects on traditional Indigenous
land using a different framework. Rather than requiring consent, Canadian courts require
that the Crown consult and accommodate the interests of Indigenous groups. Where
treaty rights or Aboriginal rights are infringed, the courts require that the Crown justify
the infringement through a test developed in R. v Sparrow, which will be described in
part two. Judges have said repeatedly that Indigenous groups in Canada do not have a
“veto” over development.
In this chapter I will look at the international consent standard with a view to
developing a conceptual framework for its adoption in interpreting the “numbered
treaties.” Eleven such treaties were signed between 1871 and 1929, and they cover a great
deal of our country, spanning First Nation territories from Ontario to parts of British
Columbia and north to the Northwest Territories. These treaties provide for the creation
of small reserves for the Indians and the “surrender” of the remaining tracts of land to the
Crown. The land that is “surrendered” continues to be available for Indigenous hunting,
fishing, and harvesting activities. However, once the land is “taken up” by the provincial
Crown for activities such as mining, lumbering, and settlement, the treaty rights to hunt,
fish, and harvest are suppressed. I will argue that the provincial Crown does not have a
unilateral right to “take up” lands; rather, the Crown should obtain the consent of the First
Nations concerned before authorizing extractive activity on traditional territories.
In the argument that follows, I refer to documents created at the international
level. However, I do not use these in the same way as my colleague Sara Seck. In her
2

chapter, she places these instruments in a transnational governance context and looks at
the treaties between First Nations and the Crown in the international sphere. By contrast,
I am looking at how to use these international instruments can be used by courts in
Canada to benchmark Crown and private company conduct in relation to the use of
traditional Indigenous territory. My argument is not that the international instruments are
binding or persuasive qua international law but rather that they are evidence of best
practices in industry that should be incorporated into the development of the common law
here. Sara Seck’s approach and my approach are different but complementary.

1. Consent and the “Numbered Treaties”
The Crown entered into the numbered treaties with Indigenous peoples in order to
ensure peace and goodwill with settlers who wished to enter the “tract of country”
inhabited by the Indians. The treaties clearly state that the objective was “to obtain
consent” of the Indians.2 The necessary implication is that the Crown recognized that
there was an Indigenous party to the treaty that could, through internal deliberations,
decide to give – or withhold – consent. The three elements of the legal framework at the
time, then, was that there was an Indigenous collectivity, that it had an interest in the
land, and that consent of that collectivity was necessary in order for the Crown to access
their territory.3
2

The James Bay Treaty – Treaty No. 9 (Made in 1905 and 1906) and Adhesions
Made in 1929 and 1930 (1931; repr., Ottawa: Queen’s Printer and Controller of
Stationery, 1964), at http://www.aadncaandc.gc.ca/eng/1100100028863/1100100028864#chp5
3
I am not implying that the legal framework corresponded to the actual practice
on the ground. For a general discussion of problems with treaty implementation, see
Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, Looking Forward, Looking Back, vol. 1 of the
3

Unfortunately, as the treaties were being rolled out between 1871 and 1929,
Canada entered into a century-long Dark Ages in its relations with Indigenous peoples.
Through the policy of assimilation, legislation was drafted that legalized the theft of
regalia, the destruction of totem poles, the forbidding of ceremonies, the taking of
children to residential schools, and the appropriation of Indigenous lands. During this
period, the legal framework for treaties and its foundation on consent were ignored. The
prevailing attitude was articulated in 1929 by a judge in Nova Scotia who found that a
1752 treaty between the British and the Mi’kmaq was not enforceable.
A civilized nation first discovering a country of uncivilized people or savages
held such country as its own until such time as by treaty it was transferred to some
other civilized nation. The savages’ rights of sovereignty, even of ownership,
were never recognized. Nova Scotia had passed to Great Britain not by gift or
purchase from, or even by conquest of, the Indians but by treaty with France,
which had acquired it by priority of discovery and ancient possession; and the
Indians passed with it.4
So instead of Indigenous nations capable of making treaties, there was a new legal
framework based on “savages” who were not capable of land ownership and therefore
had nothing to give consent to. It is based on this legal framework that Prime Minister
Pierre Trudeau released his White Paper on Indian Policy in 1969.5 He proposed to
convert reserves into private property and get rid of Indian status, thereby removing legal
space for Indigenous collectivities and Indigenous lands.

Final Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples (Ottawa: Supply and
Services Canada, 1996) at 176–9.
4
R. v Syliboy, [1929] 1 D.L.R. 307 (N.S. Co. Ct.).
5
Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, Statement of the
Government of Canada on Indian Policy (The White Paper,1969) (Ottawa: Queen’s
Printer, 1969), http://www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/eng/1100100010189/1100100010191
4

2. Consultation, Accommodation, and Veto
A powerful blowback from First Nations against the White Paper policy, and a
Supreme Court of Canada decision in 1973 that opened the possibility of Aboriginal
title,6 started to roll back this policy of legal annihilation. Judicial recognition of
Indigenous peoples was propelled by the enactment of section 35(1) of the Constitution
Act, 1982: “The existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples of Canada
are hereby recognized and affirmed.”7
In 1985 the Supreme Court of Canada said that Canada should honour the
promises made by the Crown in the written versions of the treaties,8 then went further in
1999 to reinterpret the written versions of a treaty to take into account Indigenous
perspectives.9 In 2005, the Supreme Court of Canada turned its attention to the
interpretation of one of the most important clauses in the numbered treaties, and the
clause that is central to the argument in this chapter:

And Her Majesty the Queen HEREBY AGREES with the said Indians that they
shall have right to pursue their usual vocations of hunting, trapping and fishing
throughout the tract surrendered as heretofore described, subject to such
regulations as may from time to time be made by the Government of the country,
acting under the authority of Her Majesty, and saving and excepting such tracts as
may be required or taken up from time to time for settlement, mining, lumbering,
trading or other purposes.10

6

Calder v British Columbia (Attorney General), [1973] SCR 313.
Part II of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982
(U.K.), 1982 c. 11.
8
R. v Simon, [1985] 2 SCR 387.
9
R. v Marshall, [1999] 3 SCR 456.
10
Treaty No. 8 Made June 21, 1899 and Adhesions, Reports, Etc. (1899; repr.,
Ottawa: Queen’s Printer and Controller of Stationery, 1966), at http://www.aadncaandc.gc.ca/eng/1100100028813/1100100028853#chp4.
7
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In Mikisew Cree Nation v Canada (Minister of Canadian Heritage),11 the
Canadian government approved the construction of a winter road through the Wood
Buffalo National Park which would cross the trap lines of over a dozen families who
resided near the proposed road, and would affect up to 100 Cree hunters. The First Nation
argued that the road infringed its hunting and fishing rights under Treaty No. 8 and relied
on the part of the clause that said that Indians could “pursue their usual vocations of
hunting, trapping and fishing throughout the tract surrendered.”
The Crown, on the other hand, relied on a different part of the same clause – the
part that says that lands could be “taken up” for settlement, mining, lumbering, trading or
other purposes. They argued that the text of the treaty did not say that the Crown needed
to ask permission to take up the lands and did not put any limits on how much land could
be taken up. Therefore, Indians had the right to hunt and fish only until the Crown
exercised its unilateral right to take up the lands.
The Court did not accept the Crown’s interpretation of the clause. Rather, the
Court incorporated Aboriginal understandings and found that the Crown did not have an
unlimited, unilateral right to take up lands. This approach brought the Court to look at
how the lands taken up clause would evolve over time, and divided the taking up of land
into two stages. At the first stage, only consultation and accommodation would be
required for taking up lands.12 At the second stage, when so much land was taken up that
“no meaningful right to hunt exists over its traditional territories,”13 the Crown would
11

Mikisew Cree Nation v Canada (Minister of Canadian Heritage), [2005] 3 SCR

12

Ibid, para 55.
Ibid , para 48. See also, Keewatin v Ontario (Natural Resources), 2014 SCC 48,

388.
13

para 52.
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have to do more than consult: it would have to justify its actions using the test developed
in R. v Sparrow in 1990.14
The “Sparrow test” came to be when Ronald Sparrow went fishing for food in an
area traditionally used by his First Nation. He was charged under the federal Fisheries
Act for using a net that was longer than that permitted by fisheries regulations. The
Supreme Court of Canada found that the regulation could not be permitted to interfere
with Sparrow’s Aboriginal right to fish for food and ceremonial purposes. In the course
of the decision, the Court set out the connection between Aboriginal rights and Crown
regulation in a two-part test. First, if the Crown law infringed an existing Aboriginal
right, the law would have to have a “compelling and substantial purpose.” The example
used in Sparrow for an appropriate law would be a regulation aimed at conservation of a
resources used by the First Nation. Second, the Crown needed to act honourably and
justify the infringement by consulting with the First Nation about the legislation,
infringing the Aboriginal right as little as possible and, where appropriate, providing
compensation.
This “infringe-and-justify” framework has been applied in hundreds of cases
dealing with the numbered treaties at various levels of court and has resulted in limiting
the area of land available to exercise treaty hunting, trapping and fishing rights. In the
legal framework as articulated in Mikisew Cree and Sparrow there is a right to be
consulted, but the role of consent is not developed, as we will see in later in this chapter.
Having dealt with “consultation” I next address the origin of the concepts of
“accommodation” and “no veto”. In this chapter, I am talking about rights enshrined in
14

R. v Sparrow, [1990] 1 SCR 1075.
7

historical treaties that embody an agreement between the Crown and the First Nation.
However, there has been a parallel development of law in regions of Canada where
treaties were never signed, and First Nations assert inherent Aboriginal rights to land.
Given the length of time to prove the existence of Aboriginal rights to land in court,
Indigenous people argued that they needed to halt development in the interim. The Crown
responded that until a court had decided on the existence of Aboriginal title, the Crown
could continue resource development. In Haida Nation v. British Columbia,15 the
Supreme Court of Canada rejected the Crown’s argument and found that in such cases
the Crown had a duty to “consult and accommodate”. There have been hundreds of cases
based on Haida Nation. To summarize broadly, the cases say that the Crown must engage
with Indigenous groups and try to address concerns that they raise. Indigenous parties
must participate in the process and exchange information. Whether the process of
consultation and the substantive accommodations proposed by the Crown or project
proponents is sufficient to meet the legal standard is up to the courts. If a court finds that
the Crown has met the standard to consult and accommodate, then the project can
proceed. If the standard is not met, the Court may impose conditions or may require
further consultation and accommodation. Many of these cases mention that the First
Nation does not have a veto.16 In this context, “no veto” means that the final decision on
whether the project proceeds does not lie in the hands of the Indigenous group, but rather
in the hands of the Court. To look at the issue from the Crown or project proponent
perspective, the fact that Indigenous groups have “no veto” does not mean that the project

15
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Haida Nation v. British Columbia (Minister of Forests), 2004 SCC 73.
For example, see Behn v Moulton, Contracting Ltd., 2013 SCC 26, para 29.
8

will necessary go ahead. The Court will determine whether the procedural and
substantive standards have been met.
I will return to the discussion of “no veto” in the next section, where I discuss the
relationship between the concept of veto and the concept of consent.

3. Consent, the United Nations Declaration on the Rights
of Indigenous Peoples and Voluntary Industry Codes
At the international level, developments on relations between states and
Indigenous peoples began with an assimilationist approach evident in the Indigenous and
Tribal Populations Convention (“ILO 107”) of the International Labour Organization
(ILO), adopted in 1957.17 ILO 107 was aimed at “integration” of Indigenous people into
the majority population, and focused on individual equality rights rather than rights of the
collectivity. By the mid-1980s, it became clear that Indigenous peoples themselves did
not favour such an approach, and the ILO drafted another convention, ILO 169, named
the Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, 1989.18 The change from “populations” to
“peoples” signaled a change in direction: explicitly recognizing the existence of
17

International Labour Organization, Indigenous and Tribal Populations
Convention, 1957 (No. 107), at
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:12100:0::NO::P12100_INSTR
UMENT_ID:312252. The ILO is a specialized body of the United Nations, made up of
representatives of workers, employers, and governments. It was the first organization to
have an instrument directed specifically at Indigenous people.
18
International Labour Organization, Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention,
1989 (No. 169), at
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:12100:0::NO:12100:P12100_I
NSTRUMENT_ID:312314:NO. The requirement to consult in ILO 169 came a year
before the Supreme Court of Canada released R. v Sparrow, which said that consultation
was necessary before infringing Aboriginal rights. Canada has not signed ILO 169, so it
has no legal applicability in Canada.
9

Indigenous collectivities. ILO 169 went further, requiring that Indigenous people be
consulted about resource development on their lands:
[G]overnments shall establish or maintain procedures through which they shall
consult these peoples, with a view to ascertaining whether and to what degree
their interests would be prejudiced, before undertaking or permitting any
programmes for the exploration or exploitation of such resources pertaining to
their lands.19
The growing international movement for Indigenous rights, led by Indigenous
people, resulted in the enactment of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous People in 2007 (UNDRIP).20 This declaration recognized the right of
Indigenous peoples to self-determination, the preservation of their cultures, and rights to
land in their territories. The provision that is most relevant for this chapter is found in
Article 32, which provides that Indigenous people must give their free prior and informed
consent (FPIC):
States shall consult and cooperate in good faith with the indigenous peoples
concerned through their own representative institutions in order to obtain their
free and informed consent prior to the approval of any project affecting their lands
or territories and other resources, particularly in connection with the development,
utilization or exploitation of mineral, water or other resources.21
The Government of Canada’s reaction to these provisions was baffling. Canada
was one of only four countries in the world to vote against the adoption of UNDRIP in
2007, and in 2014 at the World Conference on Indigenous Peoples, when every nation in
the General Assembly endorsed the principles of UNDRIP, Canada stood alone to raise

19

Ibid, Article 15.2.
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples [UNDRIP]
UNGA Res 61/295 (13 September 2007), at
http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/documents/DRIPS_en.pdf
21
Ibid, Article 32.
20
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an objection to the consent standard, because in its view, requiring consent would mean
that Indigenous people would have a veto over projects on their traditional lands.22
The Government of Canada was sharply out of step with international
developments and even domestic developments in the private sector.23 In the sections
below, I outline the adoption of some sort of consent standard by a number of
international and Canadian institutions to illustrate the depth and diversity of support for
FPIC. 24

A. The International Finance Corporation
The International Finance Corporation (IFC) was established in 1956 to offer
investment, advisory, and asset management services with the aim of encouraging private
sector development in developing countries. A member of the World Bank Group
headquartered in Washington, D.C., the IFC is owned, and its policies are determined by,
22

Canada’s Statement on the World Conference on Indigenous Peoples Outcome
Document” (New York, 22 September 2014), at
http://www.canadainternational.gc.ca/prmny-mponu/canada_un-canada_onu/statementsdeclarations/other-autres/2014-09-22_WCIPD-PADD.aspx?lang=eng
23
In October, 2015, a new Liberal government under Prime Minister Justin
Trudeau came into power and promised to create more positive policies for Indigenous
peoples. At the time of writing, there has not been any clear statement on whether the
new government will accept the consent standard.
24
I am not providing an exhaustive list of relevant instruments, some of which do
not mention free, prior, informed consent. For example, the Organization for Economic
and Cooperative Development’s Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises have not been
updated since 2011 and do not set out any standards specifically for Indigenous peoples.
See http://mneguidelines.oecd.org/text/. As well, I am not going to focus on different
iterations of the consent standard or address the effectiveness (or lack of effectiveness) of
the voluntary standards themselves. This chapter outlines the conceptual framework for
incorporating consent into the implementation of treaties and is not meant to be an
analysis of the standards themselves. For an overall review and critique of these
voluntary standards, see Penelope Simons and Audrey Macklin, The Governance Gap
(London: Routledge, 2014).
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its 184 member countries. Its current work in over 100 developing countries is meant to
create jobs, generate tax revenues, improve corporate governance, and improve
environmental performance by providing loans to private sector companies active in
emerging markets.25
The IFC has published performance standards that loan recipients must follow.
These standards provide guidance on how to identify and manage risks and impacts.
Performance Standard 7 requires that IFC clients identify adverse impacts on affected
Indigenous communities and develop action plans to address these impacts with the
participation of those communities. The 2006 version of the performance standards
mentioned “free, prior, informed consultation” with Indigenous peoples, but the 2012
version requires free, prior and informed consent.26
According to the IFC, the client company must procure FPIC through good-faith
negotiation with the affected Indigenous community as well as document (1) the mutually
accepted process between the parties for obtaining consent, and (2) evidence of
agreement between the parties on the outcome of the negotiations.27 The performance
standard also directs companies to involve Indigenous peoples’ representative bodies and
members of the affected communities, including vulnerable groups such as women and
youth, and to provide sufficient time for decision-making.28
25

International Finance Corporation (IFC), “About IFC: Overview,” at
http://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/corp_ext_content/ifc_external_corporate_site/about
+ifc
26
International Finance Corporation (IFC), “Performance Standard 7: Indigenous
Peoples,” at
http:/www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/1ee7038049a79139b845faa8c6a8312a/PS7_English
_2012.pdf?MOD=AJPERES
27
Ibid, para 12.
28
Ibid, para 18.
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B. The Equator Principles
The Equator Principles provide a risk management framework for determining,
evaluating, and managing environmental and social risk in projects. They primarily
function to “provide a minimum standard for due diligence to support responsible risk
decision-making”29 and are designed to assist member institutions in their decisions to
disburse loans to finance particular projects. Member institutions commit to
implementing and honouring the Equator Principles within their internal environmental
and social policies, procedures, and standards for financing projects and must not provide
project financing or project-related corporate loans where the client/project either will not
or cannot comply with the Principles.
The establishment of the Equator Principles has brought social/community
standards and responsibility – such as those regarding Indigenous peoples,
labour/employment, and consultation with affected local communities – to the forefront
within the project finance market. In doing so, they have helped rally support for the
convergence and consensus around common environmental and social standards. For
instance, multilateral development banks and export credit agencies are increasingly
drawing on and applying the same standards as the Equator Principles.30
Currently, there are eighty-four members in thirty-five countries. They are among
the most important financial institutions in the world, including Banco Santander, Bank
of America, JP Morgan Bank, Barclays, and all five of the major banks in Canada. These

29

Equator Principles, “About the Equator Principles,” at http://www.equatorprinciples.com/index.php/ep3/ep3/38-about/about/195
30
Ibid.
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institutions cover more than 70 per cent of international project finance debt in emerging
markets.31
The requirement for “free, prior, informed consent” was instituted in 2013 in
“Equator Principles III,” a change from the preceding requirement for “free, prior,
informed consultation” found in “Equator Principles II.”32

C. The International Council on Mining and Metals
The International Council of Mining and Metals (ICMM) was established in 2001
to improve sustainable development performance in the mining and metals industry. It
brings together twenty-two mining and metals companies, as well as thirty-three national
and regional mining associations and global commodity associations, to address core
sustainable development challenges.33 Canadian members are Barrick Gold, Goldcorp,
Teck, the Mining Association of Canada, and the Prospectors and Developers
Association of Canada.
The council’s May 2013 position statement, “Indigenous Peoples and Mining,”
explicitly requires its member companies to “work to obtain the consent of indigenous
communities for new projects (and changes to existing projects) that are located on lands
traditionally owned by or under customary use of Indigenous Peoples and are likely to

31

Ibid.
Equator Principles, “The Equator Principles III – 2013,” at http://www.equatorrinciples.com/index.php/ep3.
33
International Council on Mining and Metals, “About Us,” at
http://www.icmm.com/about-us/about-us
32
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have significant adverse impacts on Indigenous Peoples.”34 This is a significant shift
from the prior position, which required only consultation.35

D. Akwé: Kon Guidelines
The United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity came into force in
December 1993. It promotes “the conservation of biological diversity, the sustainable use
of its components, and the fair and equitable sharing of benefits arising from the use of
genetic resources.”36 One part of the Convention addresses traditional knowledge of
Indigenous people. In order to ensure that traditional knowledge was included in cultural,
environmental, and social impact assessments, the members of the Convention developed
the Akwé: Kon Guidelines in 2012. These guidelines state that consultations with
Indigenous groups should include a way for the local and Indigenous communities to
“have the option to accept or oppose a proposed development that may impact on their
community.”37

34

International Council of Mining and Metals (ICMM), “Indigenous Peoples and
Mining: Position Statement” (May 2013), at http://www.icmm.com/document/5433
35
Sarah A. Altschuller, “ICMM Releases Position Statement on Indigenous
Peoples Establishing Commitment to FPIC,” Corporate Social Responsibility and the
Law (30 May 2013), at http://www.csrandthelaw.com/2013/05/30/icmm-releasesposition-statement-on-indigenous-peoples-establishing-commitment-to-fpic/
36
Convention on Biological Diversity, “History of the Convention,” at
https://www.cbd.int/history/.
37
Convention on Biological Diversity, Article 8(e) in “Akwé: Kon Guidelines,” at
https://www.cbd.int/doc/publications/akwe-brochure-en.pdf.
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E. The Boreal Leadership Council
The purpose of this Canadian organization is to establish “a network of large
interconnected protected areas covering about half of the country’s Boreal Forest and the
use of leading-edge sustainable development practices in remaining areas.”38 The
seventeen members of the Canadian Boreal Leadership Council come from the finance
sector, Indigenous groups, non-governmental organizations, and the forestry industry.39
The council believes that the development of the boreal forest requires the free,
prior, informed consent of the Indigenous peoples concerned. In September 2012, the
council released “Free Prior Informed Consent in Canada,” a guidebook that provides
information on best practices for implementing FPIC.40 and in 2015 the Council
reinforced this policy in “Understanding Successful Approaches to Free, Prior, and
Informed Consent in Canada”41

F. Prospectors and Developers Association of Canada
The Prospectors and Developers Association of Canada (PDAC) is the largest
mining body in Canada, with more than 1,200 corporate and 9,000 individual members. It
published e3 Plus – A Framework for Responsible Exploration in order to help resource
exploration companies improve their social, environmental, health, and safety

38

Boreal Leadership Council, at http://borealcouncil.ca/.
Boreal Leadership Council, “Members,” at http://borealcouncil.ca/members/.
40
Boreal Leadership Council, “Free Prior Informed Consent in Canada,”
September 2012, at http://www.borealcanada.ca/documents/FPICReport-English-web.pdf
41
Boreal Leadership Council, “Understanding Successful Approaches to Free,
Prior, and Informed Consent in Canada” at http://borealcouncil.ca/wpcontent/uploads/2013/09/FPICReport-English-web.pdf
39
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performance and to comprehensively integrate these three aspects into all their
exploration programs. e3 Plus is a voluntary guideline designed to help explorers in their
decision-making for exploration projects around the world.42
The e3 Plus guidelines say that “the concept of free, prior, and informed consent
(FPIC) provides a standard for interaction with indigenous communities.”43 As a member
of the International Council on Mining and Metals, PDAC has subscribed to the consent
requirement as articulated by that organization.
Having reviewed five examples of the use of the consent standard, I turn to
reasons why the standard makes sense for such a diverse group of institutions.

4. Why Does It Make Sense for Financial Institutions and
Industry to Require the Consent of Indigenous Peoples?
Because consult is a lower standard, it would seem to make it easier to go forward
with development projects, because the Indigenous party can never say “no.” Getting
consent from the community would present another barrier for projects to overcome and
would appear to make it more difficult for projects to go ahead. Why would the private
sector be in favour of consent?
Part of the answer lies in the fact that the costs of community conflict are
significant and can result in serious impacts on companies, including suspensions and

42

Prospectors and Developers Association of Canada, “About Us,” at
http://www.pdac.ca/about-pdac/about-pdac
43
Prospectors and Developers Association of Canada, e3 Plus Principles and
Guidance Notes, at 80, at http://www.pdac.ca/docs/default-source/e3-plus--principles/e3-plus-principles-amp-guidance-notes---update-2014.pdf
17

closures of projects. The degree of opposition has resulted in violent confrontations
across the globe, with thousands of people killed, injured, and raped, and huge losses to
companies.44 For example, Newmont’s U.S.$4.8 billion Conga project in Peru faced
massive opposition, including general strikes and road blockades. Opposing the mine has
come with a heavy price for community members, with five farmers killed during one of
the protests and many community leaders injured and beaten. However, Newmont was
forced to “voluntarily” suspend operation of the mine, with losses in the hundreds of
millions of dollars.45 Another example is the Canadian company HudBay Minerals,
which purchased a Guatemalan mine that had been riddled with conflict and
assassinations throughout its history. The conflicts continued under HudBay’s ownership
as it tried to evict Indigenous people from the mine site. During one confrontation, a
community leader was murdered and others injured. The head of security of the mining
company was charged and jailed. HudBay ended up selling the mine for CAD$176
million in 2011, shortly after it was sued in Canada for the murder and for the alleged
gang rapes of women that had occurred during an earlier eviction carried out by the

44

For examples of case studies of twenty-two conflicts involving Canadian
companies in Latin America, see Working Group on Mining and Human Rights in Latin
America, The Impact of Canadian Mining in Latin America and Canada’s Responsibility
(March 2014), at
http://www.dplf.org/sites/default/files/report_canadian_mining_executive_summary.pdf
See also Justice and Corporate Accountability Project, The Canada Brand:
Violence and Canadian Mining in Latin America (October, 2016), at https://justiceproject.org/the-canada-brand-violence-and-canadian-mining-companies-in-latin-america/
45
Mining.com, “Peru Abandons Newmont’s $4.8 Billion Conga Project,” 28
August 2012, at http://www.mining.com/peru-abandons-newmonts-4-8-billion-congaproject-66180/; Earthworks, “Mining Giant Newmont Urged to Obtain Community
Consent,” 25 April 2013, at
https://www.earthworksaction.org/media/detail/mining_giant_newmont_urged_to_obtain
_community_consent#.VJXxiP8OjA
18

mine’s previous owners.46 HudBay had bought the mine three years before, for CAD$446
million.
In northern Ontario, a conflict between the Kitchenuhmaykoosib Inninuwug First
Nation and a junior mining company called Platinex would have turned out better for all
parties concerned had consent been the standard.47 In this case, the First Nation had been
asking for a moratorium on mining activity in the area since 2001 and insisted that
drilling not commence until there had been compliance with the First Nation’s
Development Protocol, which included a referendum in the community. In August 2005,
when Platinex announced its plan to begin exploration, the First Nation sent a strong
letter of objection. In October 2005, Platinex began raising $1 million by selling shares –
not mentioning the August letter of objection and, instead, telling investors that the First
Nation had given verbal consent. In February 2006, Platinex sent in a drilling team
without informing the First Nation. A confrontation occurred with members of the First
Nation, and the drilling team left. Platinex then launched a law suit for $10 billion against
the Kitchenuhmaykoosib Inninuwug. This was approximately $10 million for every man,
woman, and child on the reserve. The First Nation asked for an injunction to stop drilling.
In July 2006,48 Justice G.P. Smith ordered that drilling be halted in order to
permit consultation and negotiations to take place. Over the next few months, the Ontario
46
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Ministry of Mines and Northern Development joined in the negotiations and appeared at
subsequent hearings to support Platinex. Various proposals were made to the First Nation
with respect to employment, future consultation, a community fund, and fees for
negotiation and litigation. The First Nation refused to consent and objected to the fact
that Platinex and the ministry demanded that the First Nation agree to the drilling before
they would enter into substantive consultations. A year passed and by 1 May 2007,49 the
judge decided that the balance of convenience had shifted and drilling for phase one was
allowed to proceed.
At a hearing on 18 May 2007,50 the judge ruled that an agreement reached
between the ministry and Platinex, without the consent of the First Nation, was
satisfactory and should be imposed on the First Nation. When the First Nation continued
to block exploration activity, the judge found that the chief and the majority of the
members of the elected council were guilty of contempt of court. At the urging of a
lawyer for the Ontario government, who asked that the penalty be harsh enough ¨to make
it hurt,” the judge sentenced them to six months in jail. The matter went up to the Ontario
Court of Appeal, and the chief and councillors were released after spending two months
in jail.51
Platinex was still determined to proceed, and in August 2009 another attempt was
made to land a floatplane to begin exploration. The plane was prevented from landing by
the chief. Platinex then began negotiating with the Ontario Ministry of Northern
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Development, Mines and Forestry and settled for a payment of $5 million from the
government, far short of the $10 billion originally demanded.52
Analysing this situation, we can see that all parties suffered: Platinex lost access
to its property. Its investors lost – in December 2014, the stock was trading at one cent.53
Ontario taxpayers had to pay $5 million, and probably more to cover legal fees, to
compensate Platinex. The members of the First Nation spent time in jail.54
The Platinex case is but one example of a generalized problem. A Harvard
University report on company-community conflicts, based on case studies from around
the world, found that the absence of opportunity to consent to projects that affect the
community was one of the two major issues that precipitate conflict.55
The reality of community opposition provides practical reasons to consider
obtaining consent, but there is also a theoretical basis for favouring consent in the
thinking of those in the Harvard Negotiation Project. For them, power imbalance is
counterproductive. In the words of Lawrence Susskind and Jeffrey Cruikshank, “The
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potential parties to a consensus-building effort cannot participate in a relationship in
which one party holds all the power.”56 This imbalance may be a disincentive for weaker
parties to engage in negotiation because they may believe they have more effective extralegal options or they may believe there is more built-in protection in the adjudicative
system. If there is no true consensus, and the more powerful party imposes a solution,
even if the solution makes some accommodation for the weaker party, the weaker party
will not have made a commitment to the solution. This means that the solution will not be
as durable nor proceed with the cooperation of the weaker party. In situations where there
is conflict over a mine, it will mean continued conflict.
The problem with the consult standard is that the community feels powerless,
because they are powerless. It is difficult for people to trust a process of discussion when
they know that no matter what happens, the final decision is not in their hands. It is
through recognition of the necessity of consent that the Indigenous community will have
power that can be a balance to the superior economic power of the mining company and
the superior political power of government.

5. What Is the Difference between Consent and Veto?
I have indicated above that Canadian courts have said that Indigenous people do
not have a veto and that Canada raised objections to the consent provisions in the United
Nations Declaration on Indigenous Peoples at the 2014 World Conference on Indigenous
Peoples, saying that a veto . would be incompatible with Canadian law.
56
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A. “Veto” at the International Level
A group of First Nations attending the World Conference expressed outrage at
Canada’s position and pointed out that the word “veto” does not appear in the UN
document. Grand Chief Matthew Coon Come of the Grand Council of the Crees stated
bluntly, “The government has never explained what it means by ‘veto.’ Is a ‘veto’
absolute? If so, then a ‘veto’ isn’t the same thing as ‘consent.’57 James Anaya, United
Nations Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, takes the same position
as Coon Come. He says that there is no right to a veto if it means that Indigenous
communities can reject any project whatsoever:
When the Special Rapporteur affirms that Indigenous people do not enjoy a right
to have a veto in the context of consultation processes, he refers to the proposition
that there is absolute power to unilaterally prohibit or impede all proposals and
decisions of the state that could affect them, based on whatever justification or no
justification at all. In his view, such a proposition is not supportable. To speak of
a right to a veto in that sense, in relation to matters that can be in the legitimate
interests of not only the Indigenous party but also national society in general is
not consistent with the standard of participatory consultation that is incorporated
into international norms.58
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Although Anaya does not think that there exists an absolute veto, he goes on to
say that Indigenous communities can refuse to grant their consent when a project would
have a significant impact.
In those cases in which the impact of a proposal or initiative on the well-being
and rights of an Indigenous people is significant, the consent of the Indigenous
party, through an agreement, is not only the objective of consultation, but also a
necessary precondition for carrying out the proposed measures.59
At the international level, then, the debate is not over whether there is a veto or
not but over the circumstances in which consent is required. The consent issue was
addressed by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in the case of Pueblo Saramaka
v Suriname.60 The Saramaka are descendants of escaped slaves and have lived in the
rainforest since the seventeenth century. They carved out their own territory, which they
were able to protect from intruders until the mid-twentieth century. At that time, the
Government of Suriname began displacing the Saramaka for logging and mining. The
Saramaka brought a complaint to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, which
released its decision on 28 November 2007. The Court referred to the United Nations
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People to find that the Saramaka had the right to
be consulted and to consent before mineral and forestry development in their territory.
… the Court considers that, regarding large-scale development or investment
projects that would have a major impact within Saramaka territory, the State has a
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duty, not only to consult with the Saramakas, but also to obtain their free, prior,
and informed consent, according to their customs and traditions.61
It is fair to say that the precise parameters for identifying when consent is required
are still in development. The Inter-American Court itself provides three iterations of the
test. The above quote from the 2007 judgment mentions “large-scale development or
investment projects” that would have a “major impact within Saramaka territory.” Three
paragraphs later in the judgment, the court describes the required impact as “a profound
impact on the property rights of the members of the Saramaka people to a large part of
their territory.”62 In an Interpretive Judgment from 2008, the Court says that consent is
necessary when the impact “could affect the integrity of the Saramaka people’s lands and
natural resources.”63
UNDRIP provides specific examples of instances when consent is required from
Indigenous peoples: relocation from their lands and territories;64 the taking of their
cultural, intellectual, religious, or spiritual property;65 the taking of “lands, territories and
resources which they have traditionally owned or otherwise occupied or used”;66 and the
storage of hazardous materials on Indigenous lands.67
The International Financial Corporation’s Performance Standard 7 sets out four
similar circumstances to trigger free prior informed consent: adverse impacts on lands
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and natural resources that are subject to traditional ownership or customary use;68
relocation from communally held lands;69 significant project impacts on critical cultural
heritage;70 use of cultural heritage, including knowledge, innovations, and practices, for
commercial purposes.71
In 2012, the Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, an advisory
body to the United Nations Human Rights Council, provided a more comprehensive
description:
The Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples requires that the free, prior
and informed consent of indigenous peoples be obtained in matters of
fundamental importance to their rights, survival, dignity and well-being. In
assessing whether a matter is of importance to the indigenous peoples concerned,
relevant factors include the perspective and priorities of the indigenous peoples
concerned, the nature of the matter or proposed activity and its potential impact
on the indigenous peoples concerned, taking into account, inter alia, the
cumulative effects of previous encroachments or activities and historical
inequities faced by the indigenous peoples concerned.72
We can see that a number of formulations for the circumstances when consent is
required are being developed at the international level. I do not intend to parse the
differences in wording nor analyse the specific circumstances that have been highlighted,
as in this chapter, I focus more on the larger trajectory of the need to obtain consent.
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B. Canadian Courts and Consent in Aboriginal Title Cases
We can now turn to decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada, where the focus
has been on “infringe and justify” (Sparrow) and the duty to consult and accommodate
(Haida Nation) The cases below discuss Aboriginal title claims in situations where there
are no treaties. I apply these principles to the treaty context in part seven.
In Delgamuukw v British Columbia,73 the Supreme Court of Canada approached
the concept of consent in the context of Aboriginal title. Chief Justice Lamer noted that
arising from the Crown’s fiduciary duty towards Aboriginal peoples, “[t]here is always a
duty of consultation.” He further noted,

The nature and scope of the duty of consultation will vary within the
circumstances. In occasional cases, when the breach is less serious or relatively
minor, it will be no more than a duty to discuss important decisions that will be
taken with respect to lands held pursuant to aboriginal title … In most cases, it
will be significantly deeper than mere consultation. Some cases may even require
the full consent of an aboriginal nation, particularly when provinces enact hunting
and fishing regulations in relation to aboriginal lands.(emphasis added)74
So Delgamuuk tentatively identifies a sphere of activity where consent is required.
However, this case also provides limits on how the First Nation uses Aboriginal title
lands because of the special bond that exists between the nation and the land:
… if occupation is established with reference to the use of the land as a hunting
ground, then the group that successfully claims aboriginal title to that land may
not use it in such a fashion as to destroy its value for such a use (e.g., by strip
mining it). Similarly, if a group claims a special bond with the land because of its
ceremonial or cultural significance, it may not use the land in such a way as to
73
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destroy that relationship (e.g. by developing it in such a way that the bond is
destroyed, perhaps by turning it into a parking lot).75
In 2014, the Supreme Court of Canada released its decision in Xeni Gwet’in v
British Columbia.76 The Court found that the Tsilhqot’in First Nation had Aboriginal title
over 1,750 square kilometres (675 square miles) of land in British Columbia, which gave
them the right to decide how the land would be used; the right of enjoyment and
occupancy of the land; the right to possess the land; the right to the economic benefits of
the land; and the right to proactively use and manage the land.77 As a general proposition,
then, consent of the First Nation would be necessary for government or a company to use
Aboriginal title land. However, in a somewhat puzzling move, the Court decided the
Crown could dispense with consent if the land was needed for agriculture, mining,
lumbering, building of infrastructure, or settlement. In order to override the lack of
consent, the Crown would have to comply with the Sparrow test and show, among other
things, that there was a “compelling and substantial” purpose for dispensing with consent
and that the Crown had consulted with the First Nation.78 However, in another puzzling
move, although the Crown could override lack of consent from the Tsilhqot’in, it could
not do so if it would “substantially deprive future generations of the benefit of the
land.”79
To summarize where we are so far, we see that Xeni Gwet’in established that the
Tsilhqot’in have Aboriginal title and that consent is necessary for using their lands, but
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that the requirement for consent could not necessarily prevent agriculture, mining,
lumbering, building of infrastructure, or settlement, because the Crown could override the
lack of consent using the Sparrow test. However, the Crown override does not apply to
projects that would deprive future generations of the benefit of the land, so that the
Crown’s authority has an outer limit. Does this mean that the Tsilhqot’in themselves can
consent to uses that would deprive future generations of the use of the land? Apparently
not. Although the Court finds that the Tsilhqot’in can put their lands to use in “modern
ways,” the Tsilhqot’ins’ land cannot “be developed or misused in a way that would
substantially deprive future generations of the benefit of the land.”80 Consequently, it
appears that Aboriginal title provides absolute protection of the land for future
generations, that cannot be taken away by the Crown using the Sparrow test, nor even by
the consent of the First Nation itself. This is starting to look like a Russian doll, with
exceptions buried within exceptions.
This Canadian framework is different from the international approach, which
protects the sphere of detrimental impact by requiring free, prior, and informed consent
by Indigenous people. The international framework, as it has developed so far, has not
focused on state power to override the lack of consent by an Indigenous group, but rather
has looked at situations where consent is required, and where it is not required.
Both the international and Canadian approaches recognize that there is something
special about the link between the land and Indigenous people that needs to be protected.
However, the Canadian approach to date fails to provide sufficient agency and
recognition to the role of the Indigenous group. The Canadian approach is Crown-centric
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and primarily concerned with Crown conduct in relation to Indigenous people. This is
obvious from the questions in the Sparrow test: Is the Crown infringing Aboriginal
rights? Is the Crown consulting? Is the Crown acting honourably? The international
consent standard, on the other hand, adds a focus on the Indigenous group as well. States
have obligations to consult and ensure that there is free, prior, informed consent, and this
requirement puts Indigenous groups at the centre of the process in a way that the Sparrow
infringe-and-justify test or Haida Nation’s consult and accommodate test does not.
In the next section, I will provide some preliminary ideas on how the consent
standard could be applied to implement treaties in Canada.

6. Court Adoption of Best Practices
Standards
While private-sector corporate social responsibility initiatives have helped to
bring discussions on consent into the mainstream, these voluntary initiatives generally do
not provide any form of redress for individual complaints, and are unenforceable against
the companies themselves. As such, in cases where there is an allegation of a breach by
one of the signing institutions, the complainant is left with little or no recourse.
For instance, the Equator Principles simply oblige member financial institutions
to require any company with whom they deal to establish a grievance mechanism
designed to receive and facilitate resolution of concerns about a project’s environmental
and social performance within the company or project itself. However, the Equator
Principles do not impose a duty on its members to adopt grievance mechanisms of their
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own. Consequently, if someone feels that a member bank has lent money for a project
that does not have Indigenous consent, there is no avenue for complaining to the bank or
the Equator Principles organization.81
There are similar problems with the other standards. The e3 Plus guidelines from
the Prospectors and Developers Association of Canada are not mandatory for members,
and there is no way to determine which, if any, companies have adopted them. The
International Council on Mining and Metals (ICMM) makes its guidelines mandatory to
its members, but there is no way of complaining if there is a breach. The ICMM website
states that if the ICMM office receives a complaint, it will be referred directly to the
company; the ICMM itself does not address or mediate issues between a third party and a
member.82 The Boreal Leadership Council developed its guidelines on free, prior,
informed consent to “encourage and contribute to a solutions-based dialogue,”83 but the
council does not police adherence to the guidelines. Similarly, the Secretariat on the UN
Convention on Biological Diversity does not police implementation of its Akwé: Kon
Guidelines.
Of the organizations whose performance standards are studied in this chapter,
only the International Finance Corporation is equipped with a grievance mechanism: the
Compliance Advisor Ombudsman (CAO), an independent recourse mechanism for
projects supported by the private-sector agencies of the World Bank Group. Indigenous
groups can make a direct complaint to this agency rather than the company against whom
81
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they are making the complaint. However, the CAO merely “responds to complaints from
project-affected communities” by “help[ing] parties identify alternatives for resolving the
issues of concern.” The CAO has explicitly stated that it does not “impose solutions or
find fault,”84 so remedies to individuals or enforcement against the company are not
within its mandate.85
While the consent standards described above do not provide any direct remedies
to Indigenous communities, they do give an indication of what some bodies consider to
be “best practices” for the industry. The actions of particular government or industry
players can be judged against the best practices suggested for the industry in judicial
proceedings.
For example, the Akwé: Kon Guidelines of the Convention on Biological
Diversity are not directly binding on anyone, but the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights took note of the guidelines as a standard for assessing the behaviour of the
Government of Suriname in the consultation process in the Saramaka case. The Court
called the Guidelines “[o]ne of the most comprehensive and used standards for
[Environmental and Social Impact Assessments] in the context of indigenous and tribal
Peoples.”86 Other bodies have referenced, recognized or adopted the Akwé: Kon Guidelines
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as well, including the Kenya Industrial Property Institute,87 the UK National Contact
Point for the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development,88 the
Government of Finland89 and the Supreme Court of India.90
In Ontario, decisions in the two cases referred to the e3 Plus Aboriginal
engagement guidelines published by the Prospectors and Developers Association of
Canada, although, as I have already indicated, these guidelines are voluntary and even
PDAC members are not obliged to follow them. Nonetheless, two courts in Ontario have
used them as a touchstone for company behaviour. In Wahgoshig First Nation v Solid
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Gold Resources Corp,91 Solid Gold, a small exploratory company headquartered in
Sudbury, refused to consult with the Wahgoshig First Nation, in spite of its being advised
to do so by the Ontario government. When Solid Gold attempted to continue exploring,
the First Nation took the matter to court. In granting an injunction against further
exploration, Justice Carole Brown wrote, “[I]t … appears that Solid Gold has failed to
meet industry standards for responsible exploration as set forth by the Prospectors and
Developers Association of Canada with respect to First Nations engagement.”92
Another example is the Platinex Inc. v Kitchenuhmaykoosib Inninuwug First
Nation described above.93 Justice G.P. Smith, the judge in this case, noted that Platinex
did not follow the Prospectors and Developers Association of Canada’s Best Practices
Exploration and Environmental Excellence Standards, which state that before drilling is
to commence on lands under an Aboriginal claim, the drilling company should sign a
memorandum of understanding.94 This was one of the factors that led the judge to
suspend drilling until consultations had taken place.
We see here that some of these voluntary standards have been given life in both
international and domestic courts. In the next section I argue that the consent standard
from non-binding international and domestic instruments should inform judicial thinking.
Why should courts shy away from requiring best practices for resource extraction on
Indigenous lands?
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7. Application of Consent Standard to Numbered
Treaties
As I stated at the beginning of this chapter, I am going to sketch out some
preliminary thoughts on a legal framework for consent, building on existing case law.
The two elements of the numbered treaties that are relevant to this discussion are the
clause dealing with the “surrendering” of traditional territories; and the hunting and
fishing “lands taken up” clause. The treaties also created reserves, which are small
pieces of land, perhaps fifty square kilometres (twenty square miles), which are under a
separate Indian Act legal regime that does not apply here. The lands that are the subject
of the analysis in this chapter are large tracts that are covered by the treaty but are
outside of the reserves. I refer to these as “treaty lands.” The fact pattern I have proposed
to explore the legal framework is for extractive industry access to treaty lands (that is, off
reserve), not covered by a land claims agreement, not patented (that is, Crown lands), in a
rural area.
There are three building blocks to my analysis.
(i) Courts have found that there is an Indian interest in treaty lands in spite of the
“surrender clause” and that the Crown has neither unilateral nor unlimited
power to take up lands for extractive industry, in spite of the “lands taken up
clause.” There is a duty to consult and accommodate for any taking up of
lands, but in cases where the taking up will impact the meaningful right to
harvest, the Crown must justify its actions using the Sparrow test.
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(ii) I argue that there should be negotiations to identify how much land is needed
to maintain a meaningful right to harvest. Until there are such negotiations,
the courts need to provide a forum for identifying the point in time when the
right is threatened.
(iii) The Mikisew Cree case, discussed in part two, dealt with the “taking up” of
lands and said that “compelling and substantial” purposes could justify
taking away the meaningful right to harvest. I argue that Indigenous consent
should now be added to the justification test for future “taking up” of lands.

A. The Surrender Clause and Continuing Indigenous Interest in
Traditional Lands
The fact that the written versions of “numbered treaties” say that the land was
“surrendered” to the Crown raises the question of the nature of the Indian interest on
lands that are covered by the treaty but are outside of the reserves.
The “surrender” clause in Treaty No. 8, for example, reads like an absolute
transfer of title from First Nations to the Crown.
… the said Indians DO HEREBY CEDE, RELEASE, SURRENDER AND
YIELD UP to the Government of the Dominion of Canada, for Her Majesty the
Queen and Her successors for ever, all their rights, titles and privileges
whatsoever, to the lands included within the following limits … 95
First Nations say that they never considered the treaties to be real estate deals –
rather, they were meant to create relationships with the Crown. There is plenty of
evidence that in various negotiations, the Indians were told that their livelihoods would
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not change. In his chapter of this book, Michael Coyle explains the problems arising from
the different understandings of the treaties. Although there is some judicial support for
questioning the validity of the surrender clause as it is set out in the written version of the
treaty,96 most courts assume that the surrender is valid, and that rights to the land have
been alienated. If the surrender is valid, can consent from Indigenous groups be required
for the use of land that belongs to the Crown?
For our purposes, I do not think that we need to answer the question of who
“owns” the land. Whether or not there was a total surrender of the land, it is not disputed
that treaty First Nations have an interest in their traditional lands arising from their
traditional use and occupancy of the land. The right to continue to use the land for
harvesting purposes is written into the treaty through the “lands taken up” clause. As
indicated earlier in this chapter, this clause, if read literally, gives the Crown unlimited
unilateral authority to take up lands until there is nothing left for the harvesting activities.
The Supreme Court of Canada, however, in Mikisew Cree recognized that the Crown’s
authority was not unlimited – the First Nation needs enough land to “meaningfully”
exercise harvesting rights. Nor could the Crown exercise its authority unilaterally, as the
Court imposed a requirement to consult and accommodate the First Nation before taking
up the lands.
Canadian law is consistent with the thinking on the nature of Indigenous interest
in land at the international level. The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples refers to “lands, territories and resources which they have
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traditionally owned or otherwise occupied or used.”97 The International Finance
Corporation Performance Standard 7, which is incorporated into both the Equator
Principles and the International Council on Mining and Metals standards, specifically
provides for the requirement of consent on lands that are “traditionally owned or under
customary use.” Legal title or demarcation is not necessary:
Indigenous peoples are often closely tied to their lands and related natural resources.
Frequently, these lands are traditionally owned or under customary use. While
Indigenous peoples may not possess legal title to these lands as defined by national
law, their use of these lands, including seasonal or cyclical use, for their livelihoods,
or cultural, ceremonial, and spiritual purposes that define their identity and
community, can often be substantiated and documented.98

B. The Lack of a Forum to Discuss the “Meaningful Right to
Harvest”
As we have seen, the Crown is required to consult on, but not justify, taking up
lands until the point where there is no longer enough land to “meaningfully” exercise
harvesting rights. One of the practical challenges, then, is trying to decide when that point
in time is reached. How do we know when a particular project will send us off the edge?
Is anyone keeping track?
Individual decisions based on the rights of individuals to hunt or fish, or judicial
review of the adequacy of consultations in individual project proposals, do not provide
the overview necessary for decision-making bodies to determine whether the taking up of
land in a particular treaty area is approaching the point in time when the “meaningful
right” disappears. For example, in 2004, the Saulteau First Nations argued that there
97
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needed to be a study of the cumulative impacts of development because “if approvals are
not considered broadly in context, small incremental infringements may threaten treaty
rights by ‘death by a thousand cuts.’99 This anxiety is not misplaced, because almost
every square centimeter of land in Canada is subject to some type of non-Indigenous
interest, ranging from mining concessions and water rights for private companies to
rights of way for recreational snowmobilers. Furthermore, there is legislation in the
provinces that will permit an automatic “taking up” of treaty lands with no scrutiny or
notice whatsoever. For example, the free-entry system for mines in British Columbia
allows company to stake claims without obtaining any prior approval from
government,100 and the Ontario Court of Appeal has upheld provincial legislation that
dedicates highways for public use by the passage of time, without requiring any decision
on anyone’s part.101
In spite of these continual creeping encroachments, there is at present no
systematic process for gathering information on what rights need to be “meaningfully”
protected or how much land needs to be set aside to protect those rights. Ideally, there
would be a political negotiation process to address this problem. In an article in 2001, I
argued that the treaty lands problem can be resolved only through a process that will set
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aside enough lands to preserve the meaningful right to hunt, fish, and trap.102 Such
comprehensive negotiations on treaties as a whole were recommended by the Royal
Commission on Aboriginal Peoples as far back as in 1985,103 and by Michael Coyle in his
chapter in this book. Without a political framework, however, matters end up in court,
and the courts are struggling.
Four cases illustrate how difficult it is to find an appropriate judicial forum to
discuss the meaningful right to harvest and operationalize the test in Mikisew Cree.
In the first case, Buffalo River Dene Nation v Saskatchewan (Minister of Energy
and Resources),104 the question of timing for raising an objection to exploration is the
issue. In this case, the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal held that consultation was not
required before the issuing of an exploration permit, because there would be no actual
impact until a second permit for exploitation was issued. The court reasoned as follows:

To trigger [the duty to consult], actual foreseeable adverse impacts
on an identified treaty or Aboriginal right or claim must flow from the
impugned Crown conduct. While the test [for consultation] admits
possible adverse impacts, there must be a direct link between the adverse
impacts and the impugned Crown conduct. If adverse impacts are not
possible until after a later-in-time, independent decision, then it is that
later decision that triggers the duty to consult.105
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However, the court failed to appreciate that the exploration stage is not benign. It
sets in motion a set of expectations and financial relationships. The court itself notes that
the exploration companies must raise money from investors. These investors should
know what interests the First Nations will assert if exploitation begins. It is not fair to
allow exploration companies to keep investors in the dark. If a First Nation has a strong
position against development of resources on a particular part of their territory, investors
should know before speculating on the exploration company. Unfortunately, the Buffalo
River Dene Nation case does nothing but punt the problem into the future, where the
Crown, First Nation and mining company will find themselves deadlocked in the same
way that the parties in Platinex were deadlocked: the mining company and investors have
made financial commitments and need to move ahead with the project; the First Nation
continues to block access to its land; and the Crown must buy themselves out of a
political bind using public funds. It is a lose-lose-lose proposition.
The second case deals with the process appropriate for raising the issue of the
meaningful right to harvest. In Yahey v British Columbia,106 the Blueberry River First
Nations (BRFN), which are protected by Treaty No. 8, commissioned a study that
showed development in their traditional territory has resulted in two-thirds of their
territory being used for industry or located within 250 metres of an industrial location. At
this rate, by 2060 there would be no land left for hunting and fishing activities guaranteed
by the treaty. The First Nations asked for an injunction on the sale of certain timber
licences. The court denied the injunction on the basis that stopping the particular timber
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licences would only affect a small portion of the treaty territory, and that the First Nation
should seek a general moratorium on all development in the area.
BRFN may be able to persuade the court that a more general and wideranging hold on industrial activity is needed to protect its treaty rights until
trial. However, if the court is to consider such a far-reaching order, it
should be on an application that frankly seeks that result and allows the
court to fully appreciate the implications and effects of what it is being
asked to do. The public interest will not be served by dealing with the
matters are dealt with on a piecemeal, project-by-project basis.107
Prophet River First Nation v British Columbia (Minister of Environment)108 raises
the issue of which bodies are obliged to consider whether the meaningful right to harvest
is in play. Four Treaty No. 8 First Nations challenged the approval of an environmental
assessment for a dam on the Peace River that would have created a reservoir of 9,330
hectares. The First Nation argued that development in the Peace River basin would take
away the meaningful right to hunt and therefore, infringe the rights in the treaty. The
British Columbia Supreme Court decided that the ministers, in approving the
environmental assessment, did not have to take into consideration whether the impact on
treaty lands would take away the meaningful right to hunt. Rather, the only obligation
was to ensure that there was deep consultation. The court suggested that the larger issues
on treaty infringement needed to be raised in an action that would address the issue for
the whole territory.
The problem with the “piecemeal” approach for First Nations is that each
development, taken in isolation, will not likely constitute treaty infringement. But if First
Nations cannot raise these issues in specific cases, they will be left to do what the judge
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suggests – initiate actions for moratoria on all development in treaty territories. One
could imagine that courts would be hard pressed to impose such wide-ranging moratoria
on development, and one would anticipate a significant backlash from the non-Native
population. No such case has ever succeeded in Canada.109
In the fourth case that I want to highlight here, the issue was whether consultation
was enough to override treaty rights. In Athabasca Chipewyan First Nation v Canada
(Minister of the Environment).110 an environmental panel found that the Shell Canada
Energy Jackpine Mine Expansion in northern Alberta would have extensive irreversible
adverse impacts on the land and culture of the First Nation covered by Treaty No. 8.
Nonetheless, the governments decided to proceed with the project after a six-year study
that included “deep consultation” with the First Nation. To the extent that this case
suggests that a project which will have irreversible impacts on treaty rights can be
countenanced simply because there has been “deep consultation” I would suggest the
court is applying the wrong test. When there is an infringement of a treaty right, as
appears to be the case here, whether the consultation is adequate is the wrong test. It
seems to me that in this case, we are dealing not with a consultation problem but, rather,
with a problem relating to the infringement of the treaty that would have required the
application of the Sparrow test.
At the risk of repeating myself, let me explain where I think that courts have taken
us.

First, Buffalo River Dene Nation case suggests that First Nations cannot object if the
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exploratory activity does not have an impact on the First Nation. The First Nation must
wait until the resource extraction company and its investors have made financial
commitments to the project and plan to exploit the resource. Second, the Yahey case
makes it impossible to raise the larger issues relating to a meaningful right to hunt in an
injunction for specific licences, and Prophet River suggests that the issue cannot be
addressed in the environmental assessment process. Third, the Athabasca Chipewyan
First Nation case shows that even if the First Nation were able to show treaty
infringement, deep consultation would be enough to permit the project to go ahead. So
none of these cases permit a discussion of the big picture relating to the meaningful right
to harvest. The only option suggested by the courts is to bring a court case to stop all
development on their treaty lands. As I have already indicated, this is not a realistic
proposition, and judges themselves would likely be taken aback should such a claim ever
be made. Certainly, forcing First Nations to make such broad claims would not facilitate
reconciliation between Indigenous and non-Indigenous people, but rather invite a harsh
backlash.
If these four cases articulate the present law, the courts have closed off a
substantive consideration of whether the “meaningful right” described in Mikisew Cree
has been infringed. These cases have not attempted to construct a viable framework for
assessing when the “meaningful right” to hunt has disappeared. It is clear that a political
process is needed to resolve these issues, but is there anything that courts could be doing
differently until there are broad negotiations on treaty lands? In my view, courts can
make an important contribution.
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C. Introducing Consent into the Sparrow Test
I suggest that courts should look at development on treaty lands, not as issues
relating to consultation but as issues relating to treaty infringement. In other words, new
licences for resource extraction would not be subject to the consultation and
accommodation test set out in Haida Nation but, rather, the infringement and
justification test set out in Sparrow and Mikisew Cree. By applying the Sparrow test, the
courts would look for the Crown to do more than consult. The Crown would have to
justify the objectives of the legislation and show that it acted honourably in infringing
treaty rights.

It is here that the consent standard could be applied. As mentioned above,

the Supreme Court of Canada suggested in 1997 in Delgamuukw v. British Columbia,
that consent may be necessary where the proposed development would infringe
harvesting rights. While courts have not expanded on the concept of consent, I have
argued above that international standards and industry practice have overtaken judicial
and governmental reluctance to recognize the consent standard. So part of the
justification would involve determining whether the infringement was significant enough
to require consent.
If the default position were that any resource exploration on treaty lands could
potentially take away the meaningful right to harvest, and thereby infringe treaty rights,
then the Crown would be forced to enter discussions early with the First Nation to obtain
their consent. It may be that some accommodation could be reached for exploratory
activities and eventual exploitation. But if there were no accommodation possible, then
the mining company and its investors will know before they make irrevocable financial
commitments.
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Does this mean that First Nations would have a “veto” on all resource extraction
on their lands? Under the present, law, the answer would be “no” because courts will
decide, on a case by case basis whether the Crown has justified the infringement of the
treaty right and whether consent was obtained. Courts must do this analysis sooner or
later in any case, and it is manifestly better to face the problem earlier, rather than later
when the parties have more at stake and the losses will be more impactful.

D. Adoption of the Consent Standard Should Not be Difficult
I began by describing the three elements of the original legal framework for the
numbered treaties: recognition of an Indigenous collectivity; recognition of an interest of
the collectivity in their lands; and recognition of the necessity of obtaining consent to
access those lands.
After a dark century, where neither government nor courts recognized any of the
three elements of the framework, reconstruction began towards the end of the twentieth
century. Today, almost two decades into the twenty-first century, recognition of
Indigenous collectivities and their interest in their lands is well settled. However,
Canadian courts have not yet explicitly started developing a law around consent. Instead,
courts in Canada have been focusing on consultation and accommodation and
justification of infringement embedded in an overall lack of a “veto” by Indigenous
people. I argue in part five that an advantage of the consent standard being developed
internationally is that it puts Indigenous people at the centre of the decision on land in a
way that the infringe-and-justify framework does not. In this part, I argue that we are on
the precipice of losing the meaningful right to harvest, and that there is a legal and moral
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imperative to require consent of First Nations for further taking up of lands. I also point
out that in Delgumuukw, the Supreme Court of Canada contemplated the necessity of
consent when hunting, fishing, and trapping rights would be taken away.
But my views are also informed by the fact that consent is already the “best
practice” for the extractive industries. International state-sponsored institutions such as
the United Nations, the Convention on Biological Diversity, the Inter-American
Commission of Human Rights, and the International Finance Corporation as well privatesector bodies such as the Equator Principles, the International Council on Mining and
Metals, and the Boreal Leadership Council have already adopted the consent standard.
The adoption of this standard makes sense both practical and theoretical sense. For the
practical utility of the standard, I have given the examples of the high cost of conflict in
the multi-billion-dollar Conga project in Peru, now suspended by Newmont, and in
Canada, the halting of Platinex’s exploratory activities on the treaty lands of the
Kitchenuhmaykoosib Inninuwug. For the theoretical advantage of respecting the consent
standard, I have pointed to negotiating theory, which suggests that the greater equality of
bargaining power that comes with the recognition of the necessity of consent will more
likely lead to better and more durable outcomes.
In Canada, recognizing consent is more a conceptual barrier for governments and
the courts than an actual practical concern. Industry practice has largely moved to the
consent standard in the form of Impact Benefit Agreements (IBAs) – agreements that are
negotiated directly between companies and Indigenous communities. In return for a
promise from the community not to oppose the project, the company will provide
monetary benefits, some training, and perhaps some form of environmental
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monitoring.111 In spite of some highly publicized conflicts, like that of the
Kitchenuhmaykoosib, the majority of projects in Canada are able to proceed after IBAs
have been signed.
Government, as well, has largely moved to seeking agreements with First Nations
on large land claims. The federal and provincial governments were first forced into
negotiations with the Cree and Inuit of Quebec in 1973, when an ambitious hydroelectric
project was temporarily halted by a Quebec court that recognized an Aboriginal interest
in land.112 Although the initial case was overturned a few days later,113 the governments
and the Indigenous parties signed the first modern treaty in 1977.114 Since then there have
been about a dozen other treaties signed in British Columbia, the Yukon, the Northwest
Territories, Nunavut, and Labrador, covering, in total, 40 per cent of Canada’s lands,
waters, and resources.115 In other words, the Crown has embarked on a modern treaty111

For a discussion of impact benefits agreements, see IBA Research Network, at
www.impactandbenefit.com/ (accessed 22 December 2014). The Impact Benefit
Agreements are not without problems, including issues related to power imbalance and
lack of transparency: See K.J. Caine and N Krogman, “Powerful or Just Plain PowerFull? A Power Analysis of Impact and Benefit Agreements in Canada’s North”, 2010
Organization & Environment, 23(1): 76-98.
112
Gros-Louis v Société de développement de la Baie James (1973), 8 C.N.L.C.
188).
113
James Bay Development Corp. v Kanatewat (1973), 8 C.N.L.C. 414; and
Société de développement de la Baie James v Kanatewat (1974), 8 C.N.L.C. 373.
114

James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement, 1977, at
www.gcc.ca/pdf/LEG000000006.pdf. For a general description of this agreement, see
Shin Imai, “Land Claims in Canada” in Handbook of the North American Indians,
Volume 2, pp. 177-184 (Washington D.C.:Smithsonian Institute, 2007).
115
For a listing and description of agreements see Aboriginal Affairs and
Northern Development Canada, Final Agreements and Related Implementation Matters,
at https://www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/eng/1100100030583/1100100030584 (accessed 27
December 2014). For a perspective from the First Nations parties to these agreements,
see Land Claims Coalition, at www.landclaimscoalition.ca/ (accessed 27 December
2014).
48

making exercise that, like the historic treaties, recognizes the existence of an Indigenous
collectivity, recognizes their interest in their land, and recognizes the necessity of
obtaining consent to access their territory.
Until the Crown institutes comprehensive negotiations on treaty lands, the issues
relating to a meaningful right to harvest will continue to be presented in the courtroom.
At the present time, courts have not developed a framework nor a forum for discussing
this issue. It cannot be raised before the exploration phase because there are not impacts.
It cannot be raised during the assessment phase or the exploration phase because only the
impacts of the specific project can be considered. And even if treaty infringement is
proved, deep consultation is sufficient to allow the project to proceed.
I argue that courts can find a way out of this morass using the existing framework
developed in Sparrow and recognizing that new resource extraction activities on treaty
lands could result in treaty infringement. In analyzing justification for the Crown
conduct, courts could start developing the concept of consent first mentioned by the
Supreme Court of Canada in Delgamuukw v. British Columbia. By doing this, courts will
encourage the Crown to negotiate early and perhaps push the Crown to develop a broad
process for setting aside treaty lands to fulfill the treaty promises.

8. Concluding Thoughts
Having argued for the adoption of the consent standard, I realize that these
preliminary ideas cannot be implemented without a great deal of refinement. I will point
out four important policy issues that need further consideration.
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First, the contemporary status of the land may have an impact on the
implementation of the consent standard. Unoccupied Crown land would be relatively
straightforward to bring into the consent framework, but lands that have already been
“taken up” for extractive industries, or lands that have already been alienated to third
parties, would raise complicated discussions on how to addressnon-Indigenous interests.
Second, the precise circumstances that would trigger the necessity of consent
would have to be worked out in the Canadian context. Opinion at the international level
suggests that consent would not have to be sought on every decision that could affect
Indigenous land interests. However, the articulation of what “significant” impact would
attract the requirement for consent should be developed through the consideration of
specific cases.
Third, there would have to be some thought put into what “hunting, fishing, and
trapping” means in the context of the land as a source of livelihood today. Are these
words to be read narrowly, to encompass only subsistence harvesting activities? In my
2001 article, I argued that the harvesting rights recognized in treaties should not be seen
as rights of individual Indians, but rather as a guarantee of collective survival.116 That is,
the Crown must ensure that there are sufficient resources on treaty lands to provide for
the survival of the collective as a whole. Although the words in the treaty seem to be
limited to individual rights to harvest from the land, a more historically accurate reading
would see that the harvesting rights were a recognition that the Indigenous parties relied
on the land for their economic survival. This economic survival approach is supported in
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the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in R. v Marshall.117 In this case Donald
Marshall, a Mi’kmaq in Nova Scotia, was acquitted of fishing and selling eels without a
licence. The Court interpreted a 1760 treaty, which did not mention fishing at all but had
a clause providing for commercial relations between the British and the Mi’kmaq. As
there was evidence that fish were traded at the time of the treaty, the Court found that the
trading clause meant to protect “access to the things that were to be traded.” In other
words, the Court took into account the larger economic context of the Indigenous relation
to the land.
Fourth, would the consent standard permit a First Nation to authorize hazardous
activities, such as nuclear waste dump on its lands? In other words, does the ability to
prevent deleterious activity also provide the Indigenous group an ability to authorize
activity that would have a significant impact on its lands? I would say “no,” because the
ability of a First Nation to authorize activities on its lands involves governance issues that
are addressed in the self-government and land claims agreements mentioned above.118
The consent standard does not itself address governance issues. It has been applied at the
international level as a shield against detrimental extractive projects on Indigenous lands,
not as a sword that can give authority to Indigenous groups. Both Delgamuukw and Xeni
Gwet’in say that Indigenous people may not permit uses on their lands that would be
inconsistent with the foundation of the Indigenous connection to the land and the interests
of future generations. It seems to me, then, that in Canada, adopting the free, prior,
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informed consent standard will not open the way for unregulated deleterious uses of
Indigenous lands.
If there were treaty negotiations, these four questions would be an important part
of the discussions. Absent such negotiations, the issues will be addressed in the
courtroom. At the present time, courts in Canada are lagging behind international and
private industry standards, as well as practice on the ground. Rather than focusing on the
fact that Indigenous parties do not have a veto, courts should focus on the development of
the concept of consent.
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